\u3cem\u3eInternational Business in the 19th-Century: The Rise and Fall of a Cosmopolitan Bourgeoisie\u3c/em\u3e, by Charles A. Jones by Smith, Michael S.
University of South Carolina
Scholar Commons
Faculty Publications History, Department of
6-1-1989
International Business in the 19th-Century: The Rise
and Fall of a Cosmopolitan Bourgeoisie, by Charles A.
Jones
Michael S. Smith
University of South Carolina - Columbia, smithm@mailbox.sc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/hist_facpub
Part of the History Commons
This Book Review is brought to you by the History, Department of at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by
an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu.
Publication Info
Published in American Historical Review, Volume 94, Issue 3, 1989, pages 753-754.
http://www.indiana.edu/~ahrweb/
© 1989 by University of Chicago Press
Modern Europe 753 
region, tax farmers developed intrusive practices 
to combat evasion, fraud, and contraband. Mich- 
eline Huvet-Martinet explores the widespread 
production of contraband salt in western France, 
which persisted despite patrols by brigades intent 
on enforcing the gabelle, and Georges Clause 
analyzes prosecutions for gabelle fraud in Cham- 
pagne, where salt from Lorraine cost one-third 
the legal rate. The inherent inequity of the ga- 
belle, the evils wrought by tax farming, and the 
erection of internal fiscal frontiers all reflect the 
well-known administrative chaos of the ancien re- 
gime. Yet, given the amount of revenue at stake 
and the complexity of the gabelle apparatus, any 
reform would have entailed a wholesale fiscal 
reorganization unthinkable at the time. 
The remaining papers in this collection are so 
varied as to defy a brief summary, but they serve 
as a useful foil to analyses of the better-known 
French system. Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada 
summarizes recent research on salt taxes in 
Castile, where the ownership and production of 
salt remained a royal monopoly. Harald Witthoft 
studies the salt-producing city of Luneburg, which 
sold salt throughout the Baltic, and Kuno Ul- 
shofer surveys the fortunes of Schwabisch Hall, 
which supplied the Rhine and Neckar. In both 
cities, merchant oligarchies controlled all phases 
of the production, taxation, and exportation of 
salt. Patrizia Angelucci-Mezzetti relates a different 
experience in Siena, whose economic foundation 
lay elsewhere: the commune originally intended 
only to tax the sale of salt but became a monopo- 
listic producer and importer in order to assure its 
growing population a dependable supply of an 
essential commodity. 
A general history of salt policies clearly must 
await further archival research. In the interim, 
Hocquet has drawn attention to the pervasive, and 
often neglected, ramifications of these policies for 
social and institutional history. 
THEODORE EVERGATES 
Western Maryland College 
CHARLES A. JONES. International Business in the Nine- 
teenth Century: The Rise and Fall of a Cosmopolitan 
Bourgeoisie. New York: New York University Press. 
1987. Pp. xi, 260. $45.00. 
As the dual title suggests, this is really two books in 
one. The more successful of the two traces the rise 
and transformation of various merchant houses 
operating within the British trading empire dur- 
ing the nineteenth century. According to the au- 
thor, Charles A. Jones, an expert on British enter- 
prise in Latin America, these firms emerged and 
prospered between the 1780s and the 1840s as a 
result of the breakdown of the old mercantilist 
trade system and the advent of British industrial 
power. In the second half of the century, however, 
technological and legal innovations, such as regu- 
lar steamer service, transoceanic telegraphic 
communication, and liberalized incorporation, 
brought forth new competitors to challenge the 
established position of these houses. In examining 
the merchants' response, Jones distinguishes be- 
tween those on the "periphery" of the world trade 
system (in places such as Buenos Aires, Bombay, 
Hong Kong, and Sydney) and those at the "center" 
(meaning England and, especially, London). Pe- 
ripheral firms, he argues, attempted to defend 
themselves by specializing in commodity trade or 
commercial banking or by investing in physical 
infrastructure (port facilities, railroads, power 
companies). But, in all these businesses, periph- 
eral firms were at a disadvantage relative to 
"center" firms, which had better access to technol- 
ogy and capital. Although some peripherals sur- 
vived as independent players, most were eventu- 
ally drawn into London-based syndicates, such as 
the London and River Plate Bank or Marcus 
Samuels's "tank syndicate" (precursor of Shell 
Oil), almost all of which came to be dominated by 
center interests. By the early twentieth century, 
the peripheral firms were suffering, in Jones's 
words, "progressive marginalisation" (p. 179). 
Still, the diverse activities of these far-flung mer- 
chant houses over the previous hundred years had 
helped to lay the foundations for modern multi- 
national enterprise-a developmei -, Jones points 
out, that heretofore has been attributed almost 
exclusively to large-scale manufacturers seeking 
wider markets. 
Jones's treatment of international business in 
the nineteenth century is generally convincing 
because he assembles an enormous amount of 
illustrative detail to support it (perhaps too much). 
By contrast, his second "book," identified in the 
subtitle, although provocative, is less convincing 
because the supporting evidence is much less 
conclusive. Specifically, Jones argues that, with the 
rise of the new merchant houses of the early 
nineteenth century, there emerged a new social 
class, the "cosmopolitan bourgeoisie," bound to- 
gether by business and kinship ties as well as by the 
ideology of radical liberalism and free trade rep- 
resented in the thought and career of Richard 
Cobden. Jones clearly views this class as a force for 
good and laments its "fall" in the late nineteenth 
century when, amid the economic pressures men- 
tioned above, it supposedly fragmented into vari- 
ous national bourgeoisie, abandoned internation- 
alism, and embraced the bellicose imperialism of 
the (aristocratic) ruling elite. However, Jones's 
documentation of this ideological shift is sketchy. 
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Equally sketchy is his discussion of the kinship 
networks underlying the cosmopolitan bourgeoi- 
sie. Ties across regional boundaries-between, 
say, the merchants of Buenos Aires and the bank- 
ers of London-are not well delineated. The au- 
thor is probably onto something important, but he 
needs to map out the specific business and family 
connections much more thoroughly. In its present 
form, what he offers is less a social history than 
suggestions, albeit useful ones, for future re- 
search. 
In sum, this is an uneven but highly imaginative 
work. The author goes in too many directions at 
once, throwing out too many ideas that are never 
developed. A classic case, perhaps, of reach ex- 
ceeding grasp. Nonetheless, there are important 
arguments here that scholars will have to take into 
account in all subsequent work on the social and 
organizational history of international enterprise. 
Economic and business historians in particular 
should give this book a careful reading. 
MICHAEL S. SMITH 
University of South Carolina 
JEREMY BLACK. The Collapse of the Anglo-French 
Alliance, 1727-1731. New York: St. Martin's. 1987. 
Pp. xvi, 224. $35.00. 
The death of George I made for considerable 
confusion in English and in European affairs as 
well. To whom would the new king listen? How 
large a personal role would he choose to play? In 
which departments would he be most active? 
George II soon turned his eye to foreign affairs. 
In 1727, Britain's major alliance was with the 
French, an alliance in which Britain was the junior 
partner. Cardinal Fleury might complain that the 
English ought to pay more, as the richer of the two 
powers, but on most other issues he seems to have 
had his way. 
A French alliance in those years left George II 
to face the possibility of hostile action by any one 
of the three eastern powers-Austria, Prussia, or 
Russia. This alliance was also deeply unpopular 
with the general public, whose opinion counted 
for much, and it did little to help the British in 
their dealings with the reviving power of Spain. 
Something must be done, cried the impatient 
king: something, anything. Negotiations were at- 
tempted with all the great and many of the sec- 
ondary powers of Europe in turn, to little or no 
effect. At first, the Treaty of Seville, concluded 
with Spain, looked like something, but the Spanish 
soon repudiated it. In the spring of 1731, the 
British concluded a treaty with Austria, on terms 
very favorable to the Austrians but at the cost of 
their friendship with France. It may be that the 
Second Treaty of Vienna secured Hanover from 
Prussian attack. But it did so, Jeremy Black main- 
tains, only at the cost of isolating the governments 
of George II in the later 1730s. 
Black has searched widely and well in domestic 
and an impressive number of foreign archives to 
find material for his study. If he does not read 
Dutch, or use Spanish, he more than makes up for 
it by his discoveries in the archives of the minor 
German and Italian courts. His use of this material 
is fascinating in itself, showing how the most 
insignificant German problem ties in with major 
French and Spanish ones. But he is also careful to 
connect diplomatic issues to domestic political 
ones, so that he presents us with almost two 
monographs, one on the state of Europe and the 
other on the government of England. The picture 
that emerges is a complex one. No single individ- 
ual at this time could be sure of dominating the 
formation or execution of policy, and to claim any 
such power for Horace Walpole, or the duke of 
Newcastle, or the queen, is reductionist. This book 
may be hard reading, but it is well worth the effort. 
STEPHEN B. BAXTER 
University of North Carolina 
CHARLES B. SCHMITT et al., editors. The Cambridge 
History of Renaissance Philosophy. New York: Cam- 
bridge University Press. 1988. Pp. xiii, 968. 
$79.50. 
This is the third in the series of Cambridge histo- 
ries of philosophy, following Later Greek and Early 
Medieval Philosophy (1970) and Later Medieval Phi- 
losophy (1982). W. K. C. Guthrie's three-volume A 
History of Greek Philosophy, also published by Cam- 
bridge University Press (1962-69), has served as 
coverage for the earliest period. The structuring 
varies in all four volumes. Guthrie's works and the 
volume on later Greek and early medieval philos- 
ophy are organized according to single figures 
within themes and schools, which I prefer. The 
histories of the later medieval and Renaissance 
periods are organized by branches of philosophy. 
The Cambridge history of the later Greek and 
early medieval period is thin on Plato and Aristo- 
tle, strong on Neoplatonism and patristic thought. 
Although it reaches Anselm as a medieval Platon- 
ist, the gap between it and the volume on later 
medieval philosophy is notable. The editors of the 
later medieval history designedly emphasized the 
aspects of medieval philosophy of most direct 
interest to contemporary philosophizing; as a con- 
sequence there is minimal attention to the great 
scholastic theologians of the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries. 
The current volume attempts a broader, less 
